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Abstract: 
 
This paper evaluates the impact of the 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms on the 
consumption among single mothers. Because welfare is a provincial responsibility in 
Canada, this study is able to consider the effects of the welfare reforms in Ontario, in 
comparison with other Canadian jurisdictions at the same time. By utilizing a difference 
in difference design I compare the changes in the consumption levels among Ontario 
single mothers to changes in the consumption levels among three distinct segments of 
Canadian population. The comparison with demographically identical groups under 
different provincial administrations and the implementation of difference in difference 
propensity score matching estimates sets my approach apart from previous similar work. 
The results indicate an initial decrease in the relative consumption levels among Ontario 
single mothers. This negative policy impact is not present in the long-term results.  
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1.Introduction.  
 
 The effects of welfare reforms on living standards are of considerable importance 
to policy makers and researchers. Major changes to welfare policy have both equity and 
efficiency consequences. In the second half of the 1990’s, Canadians experienced 
significant changes in the rules governing eligibility for social assistance1 and in the 
levels of benefits. Welfare reforms were most extensive in the province of Ontario where 
they included both the 21% cut in benefit levels and the tightening of the eligibility rules. 
The segment of the population that is most dependent on social assistance, and thus most 
affected by changes to the welfare code, is single mothers. They account for 12% of 
family heads [Statistics Canada, 1996] and 30% of welfare caseload [National Council of 
Welfare, 1998]. This paper evaluates the impact of the 1995-1998 Ontario welfare 
reforms on the consumption levels among single mothers.  
I expand on the methodology adopted by Meyer and Sullivan [2004] to examine 
how different measures of consumption vary in response to transfer income shocks. They 
look at the 1996 Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) reforms in the United 
States. They utilize a difference in difference study design similar to that described in the 
following sections. Using a traditional natural experiment framework, the authors 
compare the ‘before policy’ and ‘after policy’ consumption estimates for US single 
mothers relative to estimates for childless single women and married couples with 
children. Partly as a result of the nationwide nature of the US reforms, Meyer and 
                                                 
1 The terms “welfare” and “social assistance” (which is how welfare is often referred to in Canada) are used 
interchangeably in this paper. 
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Sullivan did not differentiate between jurisdictions and, as such, did not compare single 
mothers covered by policy changes to single mothers experiencing policy stability.   
Meyer and Sullivan find evidence of a slight relative improvement in the 
consumption levels among single mothers. Their results should not appear 
counterintuitive. One could expect that a considerable ‘tightening’ of the welfare system 
should have negatively affected the group traditionally dependent on social support. 
However, those changes would be fully reflected by a fall in non-measurable utility. The 
changes in the US welfare code have made the participation in the workforce more 
attractive relative to social assistance, and thus, through well-understood, labour-leisure, 
substitution effects have resulted in an increase in average consumption.   
I utilize Canadian 1986 – 2001 household expenditure surveys and implement a 
difference in difference experimental design. In it I compare the changes in the 
consumption levels among Ontario households headed by single mothers to changes in 
the consumption levels among three distinct family types. These are the Ontario single 
childless women, Ontario married couples with children, and Quebec and British 
Columbia single mothers. The first two family types are analogues to those used by 
Meyer and Sullivan. The ability to use the third family type, and thus to take an 
advantage of variations in provincial policy, sets my approach apart from their study. The 
suitability of each of these groups for the purpose of control in the natural experiment is 
discussed in the following section. 
Recent related Canadian literature evaluates welfare reforms from the perspective 
of welfare take-up, spell-duration and welfare-to-work related questions [Beaulieu et al 
2005, Lemieux and Milligan 2004, Milligan and Stabile 2004, Fortin et al 2004, Green 
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and Warburton 2004, Roy 2004, Sceviour and Finnie 2004, Dooley et al 2000]. To my 
knowledge this study represents a first attempt to move beyond those issues and to 
evaluate the effects of Canadian welfare reforms by focusing directly on household 
consumption.  
Total family consumption is a useful indicator of economic well-being. While 
exact data on consumption is seldom available, it has become standard practice to use 
estimates of the family budget constraint or total family expenditure. I use reported 
estimates of individual family total expenditure as proxy measures for consumption, as 
did Meyer and Sullivan [2004]. As an alternative measure of consumption I also use net 
income after taxes2, I find that when total expenditure or total after tax family income are 
used as measures of family consumption, there is considerable evidence of a temporary 
fall in the relative consumption levels among Ontario single mothers. I also find evidence 
of no long-term policy effects. This lack of long-term consequences suggests a 
subsequent recovery from the initial drop. When Quebec and B.C. single mothers are 
used for comparison the results are most consistent across various methods and 
specifications. These results also indicate significant between period variation in 
consumption levels among single mothers.  
The remainder of the paper is composed as follows: Section 2 provides an outline 
of the relevant policy reforms; Section 3 describes the data and the sample selection 
methods; Section 4 outlines the methodology; Section 5 discusses the key results; Section 
6 concludes. 
                                                 
2 Additionally in the appendix available online, I explore several components of the budget constraint. 
These are social transfer family income, wage income and change in assets. 
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2. Outline of the 1995-1998 policy changes: provincial Welfare Reforms and the 
introduction of the National Child Benefit program. 
 
 Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia are the three most populous Canadian 
provinces, and together they include about three out of four Canadians. The majority of 
Canadian single mothers and Canadian welfare recipients also inhabit these provinces. 
The relative stability of Quebec and British Columbia welfare laws, during the 1995-
1998 period allows for (at least partial) detection of Ontario specific outcomes in relation 
to nation-wide trends.  
The years from 1995 to 1998 were marked by considerable reductions in the 
number of welfare recipients within each of the provinces under consideration. Table 1 
illustrates this decline. According to the Canadian Council of Social Development [1995, 
1998], the number of Ontario welfare recipients decreased by 19% during this period. 
The proportional fall in British Columbia was 21%, while the fall in Quebec was only 
10%.  
A difference in difference experimental design allows for observing the magnitude 
of the relative changes in the dependent variable without fully understanding the causality 
behind those changes. However, in order to interpret the relationships implied by the 
observed results, one needs to possess a basic understanding of the policy changes 
underlying the experiment. Both federal and provincial governments initiated these 
changes. The relevant reforms can be grouped into (i) welfare system related reforms and 
(ii) National Child Benefit related reforms. Welfare program reforms were provincial 
initiatives and were typically designed to make dependence on social assistance less 
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attractive in relation to paid employment. The National Child Benefit (NCB) was a joint 
federal-provincial program that offered new subsidies to low-income families with 
children and, in most provinces, also made participation in the workforce more attractive 
relative to welfare. What follows is a brief description of these policy changes indicating 
how they provide a suitable natural experiment.  
 
Welfare Reforms in Ontario, Quebec and B.C.: 
Ontario enacted the most extensive welfare reforms of all Canadian provinces in 
the 1990’s. In 1995, welfare benefit levels were cut by 21 percent3. The Ontario Works 
Act was passed in 1996 and implemented in 1998.4 Ontario Works was implemented 
gradually, but the objective of the program remained constant. Its overriding focus is to 
redirect people from permanent dependence on welfare towards the shortest route to full 
employment. Regulations regarding eligibility for benefits were changed in order to make 
dependence on welfare less attractive relatively to paid employment. Couples living in 
common-law relationships were no longer able to claim sole support for the purpose of 
increased eligibility. Participation in academic upgrading, retraining and job-search 
related activities, was no longer an option but a requirement for welfare eligibility. The 
grounds for exemptions from participation in the above activities were also increasingly 
restricted during the implementation period.5 When Ontario Works was fully 
implemented, the only groups permanently exempted from participation were seniors and 
                                                 
3 Even after cuts the benefit levels remained the highest of all Canadian provinces when not adjusted for 
province specific cost of living. 
4 Social Assistance Reform Act. 
5 For a more detailed overview consult Ontario Works Program Overview 2001. 
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the disabled.6 This general participation requirement was the most important feature 
distinguishing the Ontario reforms from the policies adopted in Quebec and B.C.  
In 1998, single mothers lost their previously automatically awarded exemption 
from participation in job search or training. In order to remain eligible for benefits, they 
too were required to demonstrate their efforts to move to paid employment. We can 
therefore divide the years under consideration into two separate policy periods: (i) the 
early (pre 1998) reform period of benefit cuts, initial reforms and exemptions, and (ii) the 
late (post 1998) reform, period after all the reforms had been implemented and 
exemptions tightened.  
By comparison to Ontario, the province of Quebec experienced only minor 
reforms to welfare policy during the 1995-98 period. The policies adopted in Quebec 
emphasized transition to employment by gradual rather than by fastest possible means. 
The transition was to be achieved through training and skill improving programs. Benefit 
levels were not reduced and paid employment was to become more attractive to welfare 
recipients by means of improvements to the situation of low-income workers. Further 
changes, legislated in 1999 and after, proceeded in an unchanged spirit: the number of 
services offered seemed to increase steadily but participation in these programs was not a 
mandatory requirement for eligibility for social support. [The National Study of Welfare 
to Work Programs, Phase 1 and Phase 2, Quebec] 
British Columbia also adopted a series of welfare reforms during the second half 
of the 1990s. In 1996: the BC Benefits (Youth Works) Act and the BC Benefits (Income 
                                                 
6 Temporary exemptions (typically of three month duration) could be granted only on the following 
grounds (i) having a temporary medical condition, (ii) lacking of an appropriate daycare, (iii) caring for the 
disabled, (iv) caring for family members suffering from a documented medical condition, (v) caring for 
seniors with documented special needs, (vi) requiring pregnancy/parental leave and (vii) being a single 
parent caring for a pre-school age child. 
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Assistance) Act were passed. The first of the acts was aimed specifically at the reduction 
of unemployment among youth (age 19-24). According to its provisions, young adults 
unable to support themselves were eligible for social assistance under conditions similar 
to those adopted by Ontario for most welfare recipients. In B.C. these young welfare 
recipients had to actively seek employment and to participate in job training. In return 
they were offered an allowance and priority placement both in skills training programs 
and in employment. For the rest of B.C.’s population, however, participation in job 
search or training was not an explicit condition for welfare eligibility. [The National 
Study of Welfare to Work Programs, Phase 1 and Phase 2, British Columbia] 
 
National Child Benefit7 
The National Child Benefit (NCB) is a joint federal-provincial program designed 
to provide financial aid to children of lower-income families. NCB went into effect in 
1998. In Ontario, B.C. and in a number of other provinces the program encourages 
working families to remain in the workforce [Milligan and Stabile 2004]. In these 
provinces benefits provided by NCB are not available to welfare recipients and thus they 
provide an additional incentive for continued participation in paid employment. In 
Ontario provincial social assistance benefit levels were reduced by the amount provided 
federally under the NCB program. These “saved” provincial funds are then redirected 
towards investments designed to improve the well-being of low-income children.  In July 
1998, Ontario introduced the Ontario Child Care Supplement for Working Families. This 
program provides for annual benefits of up to $1020 per child to cover the child-care 
expenses of families with earnings above $5000 (the benefits are reduced if earnings 
                                                 
7 National Child Benefit Progress Report 1999, Appendix 1. 
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exceed $20 000). The families eligible are (i) those in which one of the parents is 
working and the other takes care of children below the age of seven, and (ii) one of the 
parents is a student or trainee and the family incurs child-care expenses. Additional funds 
(about $200 annually) were also made available specifically to working single parents.  
Ontario municipalities pay about 20% of the costs of social assistance and hence some of 
the funds freed by NCB are reinvested into various local programs.  
British Columbia had a provincial program similar to the NCB as early as 1996 – 
the B.C. Family Bonus. In 1998, NCB benefits were integrated into this provincial child 
benefit transfer program. Because NCB supplemented the provincial program, the 
“saved” funds were redirected mainly towards the B.C. Earned Income Benefit program 
aimed at reducing the disincentives faced by low-income families reentering 
employment. In B.C., just like in Ontario, NCB provided incentives to leave social 
assistance and to enter employment [Pennock 2003]. 
The Quebec government has not officially joined the NCB initiative. Quebec 
families receive federal NCB transfers that are not integrated with the provincial system 
and are not contingent on entering or continuing employment [Milligan and Stabile 
2004]. Further, in 1997 the province of Quebec introduced, the well-publicized, five-
dollars-per-day childcare program that provides universally subsidized childcare to 
Quebec families.8 The eligibility for this subsidy is not contingent upon labor force 
participation.  
                                                 
8 This program has limited average impact on the standards of living among single mother households. As 
outlined by Lefebvre [2004] the majority of Quebec children registered in subsidized childcare are those 
from higher income families (with incomes above $40 000). Single mother households typically fall into 
lower income brackets and are consistently underrepresented among those enrolled in the program. Baker 
et al [2005] further explain that lower income Quebec families are eligible for a significant childcare 
subsidy that they have to forgo in order to be eligible for the $5/day childcare. For families with incomes 
$20 000 the value of this subsidy exceeds the value of the subsidy under the $5/day alternative. 
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Control Group Suitability. 
The Ontario welfare reforms and the National Child Benefit initiative should have 
similar consequences for single mothers - the attractiveness of paid employment relative 
to welfare should have increased as a result of both reforms. Lemieux and Milligan 
[2004] point out that the eligibility for welfare benefits of Canadian singles and non-
parents is one of the features distinguishing the Canadian welfare rules from the US 
system. It can thus be argued that, unlike in US, single childless women and married 
couples with children were also affected by the Ontario welfare reforms. Married couples 
with children were also affected by the NCB reforms. The effects of both the welfare and 
the NCB reforms should be qualitatively similar for all affected groups. Also, single 
mothers in B.C. (but not in Quebec) should be affected by the introduction of NCB in a 
manner similar to Ontario single mothers.  
Sceviour and Finnie [2004] show that Canadian single mothers rely on welfare to 
a much higher extent than single childless adults or married couples with children. 
Sceviour and Finnie also show that, over the 1995 to 2000 period, the likelihood of an 
Ontario single mother receiving social assistance changed considerably more than it did 
for a single woman or a married couple with children. 9 This low vulnerability to welfare 
policy changes (relative to single mothers) makes single childless women and married 
couples with children suitable as control groups in the experiment.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Consequently Baker at al demonstrate that the average subsidy per single parent family remained largely 
stable between 1992 and 2002. 
9 Sceviour and Finnie [2004] examine trends in incidence of social assistance over the reform period.  They 
show that between 1995 and 2000 the proportion of Canadian single mothers relying on social assistance 
fell from 50.1% to 33.6%. At the same time the social assistance rates for Canadian singles fell from 20.1% 
to 15.9% and the rates for couples with children fell from 8.9% to 5.9%. Within Ontario, single mother 
social assistance rates fell from 56.1% in 1995 to 33.2% in 2000. The rates for Ontario singles and Ontario 
married couples with children fell from 20.9% to 14.1% and from 10.3% to 5.6% respectively. Finally, 
between 1995 and 2000, social assistance rates for single mothers in Quebec fell from 45.7% to 32.0% and 
in B.C. they fell from 52.7 to 37.1%. 
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The partial treatments affecting the control groups are not equally shared across 
all three groups. Quebec and B.C. single mothers are immune to Ontario specific effects. 
Similarly, any province specific trends present in Quebec and B.C. will be absent in 
Ontario. Due to low intensity of welfare dependence of Ontario control groups, they are 
much less likely to be affected by the changes to welfare code than the single mothers. 
Similarly, the relatively low intensity of policy reforms in Quebec and B.C. is likely to 
have little comparable impact on the consumption of Quebec and B.C. single mothers 
control group. In this paper the results are stable across control groups that do not share 
common treatments. This suggests a presence of a consistent effect of Ontario welfare 
reforms on the province’s single mothers, even if various other treatment effects cannot 
be completely eliminated from the control groups. 
 Another way to argue for the suitability of the control groups is to agree that the 
second half of 1990s was a time of widespread welfare reforms all over Canada. Policy 
changes affecting most of Canadians were bound to happen. Thus the effects of Ontario 
reforms in the context of a difference in difference natural experiment should not be 
formed around an empirically irrelevant counterfactual of no-policy change. The results 
relative to other jurisdictions can be interpreted as formed around a counterfactual of less 
extensive policy reforms. Similarly the results relative to other Ontario based control 
groups can be thought of as addressing a counterfactual of less effective policy targeting. 
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3. Data. 
 
The data for this paper come from the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey 
(FAMEX) and its subsequent replacement, the Survey of Household Spending (SHS). 
Both surveys are based on the same Statistics Canada labor force sampling frame and use 
the same weighting system. They cover the same population and the same geographic 
areas. Finally, both surveys include a number of identically or nearly identically defined 
variables. As such, merging the surveys for our purposes is a relatively straightforward 
matter.10 
I divide the time frame into three periods. Period one includes the years before the 
1995 benefit reduction. From this period I use the 1982, 1986 and 1992 surveys. The rest 
of the available FAMEX surveys have been dropped for the following reasons: The 1984 
and 1990 surveys cover only families living in certain urban areas. It is generally 
accepted that the cost of obtaining a given standard of living varies between urban and 
rural areas and hence an inclusion of these years into the analysis would bias the results. 
It might not be possible to distinguish the effect of particular policies from the effect of 
living in an urban area. The 1978 survey was dropped because of an inability to match 
the key variables with the rest of the data. The 1969 and 1974 surveys were deemed 
irrelevant.  
Period two, the early reform period, refers to the years 1996, 1997 and 1998, the 
first years after the welfare cuts. These years include the period of gradual 
implementation of Ontario Works, the narrowing of exemptions from participation in job 
search and training related - activities, and the introduction of the National Child Benefit. 
                                                 
10 For more details consult Statistics Canada. (2000) 
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The 1996 survey is the final FAMEX survey and the following two are the first SHS 
surveys.  
The final period, the late reform period, includes all available SHS data after 
1998: i.e. the 1999, 2000 and 2001 surveys. It covers the time period when all the Ontario 
welfare reforms were fully implemented. This division into three time periods makes it 
possible to construct a two stage difference in difference experimental framework in 
which the immediate transition effects of policy (early reform period) are isolated from 
the effects after adjustment (late reform period). 
The estimated sample was selected using the following guidelines. With the 
exception of the 1996 survey, only households headed by persons of age 18 to 64 were 
included. The demographic information in the 1996 survey is inconsistent with the rest of 
the surveys. For that year only, households headed by individuals who were 16 or 17 
years of age were included. Also, in order to maintain continuity of age definitions 
between the FAMEX and SHS surveys, all reported age answers were bottom-coded at 
25.  
The treatment and control groups were selected as follows: single mother 
households, for both treatment (Ontario) and control (Quebec and B.C.) groups, were 
defined as those headed by a non-married female age 18-64, including no other persons 
of age 18-64, at least one child of age 15 or younger, and no persons of age 65 and over. 
Married couples with children were defined as two opposite sex, married people age 18-
64, at least one child of age 15 or younger, and no persons of age 65 and over. The 
selection of single women living alone was a trivial process. 
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The above specification criteria for sample selection are not ideal, and are dictated 
by the demographic information available. One shortcoming is that only those single 
mothers who were living in households with no other adults are included. Fortunately, as 
Dooley [1999] points out, close to 90% of Canadian single mothers with young children 
reside in single adult households. I was also not able to exclude students, whose 
consumption levels can be interpreted as a consequence of their investment strategy and, 
as such, do not make suitable control groups. These shortcomings have potential 
consequences for interpreting labor supply decisions or for interpreting relative 
magnitudes of various budget constraint components.   
 
4. Methodology: 
 
 The results discussed in the next section were produced in three stages. First, 
‘raw’ difference in difference estimates were created by a way of simple comparisons of 
the means within the traditional ‘before/after treatment/control’ four-cell framework. 
Second, I followed the methodology adopted by Meyer and Sullivan [2004] and 
introduced additional information using regression adjusted difference in difference 
analysis. The incorporation of the demographic details allows separating the mean 
changes in consumption resulting from policy effects from those resulting from the 
changes in the characteristics of Ontario single mothers and the relevant control groups. 
Third, I applied propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference methodology 
to further account for differences between treatment and control groups.  
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In order to account for the household economics of scale, all of the results were 
estimated on per household and per household member basis. First, separate estimation 
routines were run with various measures of household consumption as dependent 
variables. Second, each of these consumption measures was divided by the household 
size and then otherwise identical estimation routines were performed again. I was 
therefore able to interpret the results as accounting for the upper and the lower bounds of 
households’ economies of scale (with the true result being somewhere in between). The 
differences in results between per household and per household member estimates are 
negligible.11 For ease of interpretation all the results are presented on a per household 
member basis. 
Meyer and Sullivan point out that expenditure is typically a more reliable measure 
of consumption (and hence a better indicator of the material standard of living) than 
income is. I have therefore constructed a measure of total expenditures on all goods and 
services that cannot be considered investments.  I use the sum of expenditures on a series 
of composite commodities. The composite commodities included in this measure are food 
purchased from stores, food purchased at restaurants, shelter, household operation, 
furnishings, car purchase, gasoline, car operation, public transit, personal care services 
and supplies, alcohol and tobacco, recreation and clothing. I have also used after-tax 
income as another consumption measure.12  
The 1992-base Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been used to deflate all 
expenditure and income measures. Alternatives to the national CPI include a budget-
                                                 
11 Similarly Meyer and Sullivan [2004] have also found that the choice of the equivalence scale was of 
minor consequence. 
12 Attempts to use the following three components of budget constraint: (i) government transfer income, (ii) 
wage income, and (iii) yearly change in assets, as dependent variables are not presented here but are 
discussed in the appendix that is available from the author. 
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share-weighted mean of several commodity-specific price indexes, and province-specific 
deflators. Sensitivity tests revealed no significant differences across these alternative 
specifications of the deflator.  
For the regression adjusted difference in difference approach I use the following 
model to compare responses of Ontario single mothers to those of single mothers in 
Quebec and B.C.  
( ) ( )1 2 3' ' 'if c dOntariodper dOntario dper X4 5'β β β β= + + + + β  (1) 
where ( )if c  is a function measuring per capita consumption by household i, dOntario is 
an Ontario dummy, dper is a vector of time period dummies13, dOntariodper is the 
interaction term formed by multiplying the Ontario dummy by the time period dummies, 
and X is a vector of demographics.14  
The regression model used to compare the consumption levels among Ontario 
single mothers to the consumption levels among Ontario unmarried childless women or 
to those among Ontario married couples with children is the following: 
( ) ( )1 2 3 4' ' 'if c SMdper SM dper X 5'β β β β= + + + + β
                                                
  (2) 
where SM is a single mother dummy and SMdper is the is the single mother time period 
interaction term.  
The effects of the experiment are the coefficients on dOntariodper or on SMdper 
(the treatment group-time period interaction terms) that capture the difference in 
 
13 There are two time period dummies. The first is set equal to 1 for observations recoded during the early 
reform and 0 otherwise and the second is set equal to 1 for observations recoded during the late reform 
period and 0 otherwise. The pre-reform period is set as base. 
14 Unfortunately, the only three demographic characteristics that could be successfully traced across all the 
survey years are the household size, the age of head of household and the dummy variable set to 1 for 
observations recorded in cities above 100 000 residents. The lack of any education level related variables 
within the Survey of Household Spending precluded the option of focusing on low educated single mothers 
(like Meyer and Sullivan 2004). 
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difference policy effects on the Ontario single mothers. The treatment group dummy 
accounts for the effect of being an Ontario single mother on the predicted consumption 
levels of households. The time period dummies account for the general time trend effects, 
and the pre-policy period is set as base. The interaction terms capture the effects specific 
to single mothers in respective time periods, and, as such, account for the differences in 
the predicted consumption levels between Ontario single mothers and either of the 
control groups in each of the two policy time periods. 
I use one control group at a time and drop the other control groups out of the 
estimation. Alternative geographic specifications for equation (1) were used, as were 
control groups made up exclusively of Quebec single mothers, or exclusively of B.C 
single mothers.  The sensitivity of equation (1) results to using either of these provinces 
alone is marginal15.  
The transformation chosen for the dependent variable is ( )1sinh /cθ θ− which is 
the inverse hyperbolic sine proposed by Burbidge et al (1988). θ is a parameter set equal 
to one (as in Browning and Crossley 2004) and c is the measure of consumption. This 
transformation handles large positive values in a manner similar to logarithms, but, unlike 
logs, it allows for admitting non-positive values.16 
After the ‘raw’ and regression adjusted approaches, the third type of analysis is 
propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference. Matching estimators assign 
                                                 
15 Similarly, if equation 1 is estimated using all of Canada’s non-Ontario single mothers as controls, the 
general conclusion of the difference in difference results holds across all specifications. What seems to vary 
is the level of significance. 
16 This property is especially practical when the components of the budget constraint such as the 
government transfer income, the wage income, or the yearly change in assets and liabilities are used. These, 
measures are positive for only a fraction of a population and, as such, could not be properly accounted for 
in a traditional log linear framework. These results are discussed in the, available online, appendix. For net 
income and expenditure regressions which transform always positive dependent variable the results from 
regressions using inverse hyperbolic sine of the dependent variable produce marginal effects nearly 
identical to their log linear alternatives.  
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each member of the treatment group to a member(s) in the control group who exhibits 
similar observable characteristics. Conditional on those characteristics, potential 
experimental outcomes are assumed independent of treatment or control group 
membership. Only those members of the treatment group and the control group for whom 
a suitable match can be found are included in the analysis. In other words, matching 
adjusted difference in difference estimators compare the before and after differences 
between treatment and control groups only over the so-called common support range.17  
The larger the number of the characteristics that determine the common support, 
the more complex and computationally intensive is the resulting matching process. 
Fortunately, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that matching can be obtained by 
pairing treatment and control subjects according to their propensity scores obtained from 
a parametric model that estimates the conditional probability of belonging to an 
experimental treatment group. Logistic regression is used for this purpose. 
Matching routines implemented for this paper are conducted as follows. First, 
propensity scores from a logistic regression on participation within the program (i.e. on 
being an Ontario single mother) are obtained. Those regressions utilize the same 
demographic characteristics as the regressions in stage two of the analysis. In each case 
Ontario single mothers are matched to members of one control group while the other two 
control groups are dropped from the analysis. Second, I perform the matching using the 
psmatch2 STATA procedure developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003). Kernel matching 
is utilized instead of the typical, single, nearest neighbor matching.18 This procedure 
matches each of the members in a treatment group who fall within the common support 
                                                 
17 For an in depth summary of different matching estimators consult Smith and Todd (2003). 
18 In the case of nearest neighbor matching, the presence of observations with identical propensity score 
values can cause the sorting order of the data to affect the results. 
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region to a weighted average of several subjects within the control group. While the 
psmatch2 procedure allows for several different choices of Kernel weighting functions, 
they all produce very similar results and so the default Epanechnikov Kernel specification 
has been used.19  
 
5. Results.  
 
5.1. Summary statistics and ‘Raw’ difference in difference results. 
 Tables 2 and 3 offer an overview of the data. Table 2 provides sample sizes, 
represented population sizes, and per capita weighted means of various components of 
the budget constraint. Table 3 further provides a by source of income breakdown of the 
budget constraint. The results in tables 2 and 3 are presented for every year of the data, 
for each of the groups analyzed. Several trends appear for both total expenditure and total 
net income. First, in 1992 and earlier, Ontario single mothers enjoyed higher per capita 
income and expenditures levels than single mothers in Quebec and B.C. That relationship 
was reversed with the introduction of welfare reforms in Ontario in 1995. It was not until 
2000 that Ontario single mothers again had higher levels of income and expenditure. 
 Second, average transfer income is only a fraction of the average wage income for 
each group and year. This is consistent with the government transfer income being 
designed to provide only a minimal sustainable standard of living. Between 90 to 100 
percent of Ontario single mothers reported positive government transfer income, but this 
                                                 
19 The Epanechnikov Kernel takes the form: 2
3 11
4 5 5
5
0
z
if zK z
otherwise
⎧ ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎪⎪ ⎝ ⎠ <= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
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represents only a fraction of net income on average. In the pre reform period between 60 
and 72 percent of Ontario single mothers reported positive wage income, but this figure 
dropped by about 10 percent during the early policy period. This last finding is especially 
interesting, given the goal of Ontario policy reform, and the rising employment rates of 
Quebec and B.C. single mothers during the same period. Table 3 shows that it was not 
until the post implementation period that the employment rates of Ontario single mothers 
increased and eventually surpassed the levels in other provinces.  
A pair of probit regressions for labor force participation was run to further 
investigate the employment decisions of Ontario single mothers. Two distinct dependent 
variables were used: ‘participated in wage employment at any time during the reference 
year’ and ‘participated in wage employment for all of the 52 weeks of the reference 
year’.20 The results in table 4 indicate that during the implementation period, Ontario 
single mothers experienced a decrease in their labor force participation rates relative to 
Quebec and B.C. single mothers. These results also indicate that, relative to the other two 
control groups, Ontario single mothers have experienced a considerable increase, of up to 
20 percent, in labor force participation during the post implementation period.  
 Table 3 illustrates another feature, more consistent with the policy timing. This is 
a decrease in the incidence of reported positive transfer income among Ontario married 
couples with children starting in 1996. The first period of Ontario welfare reforms is 
associated with a decrease of up to 30 percent in the proportion of Ontario married 
couples with children receiving any transfer income at all. It does appear that the Ontario 
welfare reforms had the immediate effect intended by policymakers. The implementation 
                                                 
20 Alternative specifications controlling for the differences between part time and full time employment 
were also tried. These added little extra information. 
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of the 1998 National Child Benefit Act, however, had only slight, if any, effects on either 
the incidence, or the amount of transfer income received. No similar pattern can be 
observed in the behavior of single childless women in Ontario. 
Most of the survey respondents reported changes in assets and liabilities, but on 
average these were small relative to other measures. The data do imply however that 
Ontario single mothers tend to dissave between $300 to $700 more than Quebec and B.C. 
single mothers in almost every surveyed year, but there does not appear to be any 
correlation between policy timing and the magnitude of these asset changes.  
 Table 5 provides a first set of difference in difference estimates.  First, differences 
in after tax income and expenditure between the treatment group and each of the control 
groups were recorded for each period.21 These are listed under the difference headings. 
Second, the difference in difference figures were obtained by way of simple subtraction 
of the base period results from the two policy period estimates. The early policy period 
marks a drastic decrease in mean net income and in total expenditure of Ontario single 
mothers relative to single mothers in Quebec and B.C, and relative to the other two 
Ontario based control groups. This decrease is estimated at 1230 dollars of income, and 
1045 dollars of expenditure, relative to single mothers in other provinces. Relative to 
unmarried single women, the decrease is 469 dollars of income and 637 dollars of 
expenditure. Relative to married couples, the corresponding figures are 1530 dollars of 
income and 1321 dollars of expenditure. With exception of results relative to single 
unmarried women all the estimates of the initial relative fall are significant at 5% level. 
These results suggest, that it was not until the post implementation period, that the 
                                                 
21 As shown in the appendix the difference in difference results for wage income, transfer income and 
change in assets cannot be considered reliable. 
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relative levels of consumption of Ontario single mothers have at least partially recovered.  
While the magnitude of the results varies, the overall pattern of initial decline and 
followed by a recovery repeats across all subsequent specifications.  
The early reform period drop in net income and total expenditure, relative to 
Quebec and B.C. single mothers is significantly below the one relative to Ontario married 
couples and significantly above the one relative to Ontario single childless women. The 
estimates for the change relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers show a nearly 
complete reversal of the effects of the initial shock. The lack of significance, of late 
reform difference in difference results, suggest no long-term policy effect. The late 
reform difference in difference policy effect relative to single unmarried women depends 
on the choice of the consumption measure; it is positive for net income and negative for 
total expenditure. The results for married couples with children show only a partial late 
reform improvement with the net effect being a relative decrease of 728 dollars of 
expenditure and 641 dollars of income.  
 
5.2. Regression adjusted difference in difference results 
Two regressions were run in order to further investigate the relative changes in 
the consumption levels of Ontario single mothers. Tables 6 and 7 describe the results of 
two sets of regressions. Table 6 uses total per capita family net income as a dependent 
variable. Table 7 uses, per capita total expenditure measure. The early reform period is 
associated with a statistically significant fall in the relative consumption levels among 
Ontario single mothers. The magnitude of this relative decrease ranges from five up to 
fifteen percent depending on the control group chosen. In the first policy period the 
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consumption levels among Ontario single mothers fell by a nearly equal magnitude 
relative to Ontario married couples with children and to single mothers in Quebec and 
B.C.  This result is difficult to reconcile with what could be expected as a likely policy 
implication. It should be expected that the consumption levels of groups adversely 
affected by the policy changes fell the most relative to those who were unaffected. 
Contrary to this logic, it appears that despite the tightening of the welfare system, the 
consumption levels among Ontario single mothers fell by similar amounts relative to 
single mothers outside of Ontario (unaffected by a policy change), as they fell relative to 
a control group that was affected the most. Thus, the consumption levels among Ontario 
single mothers fell the most relative to those who, because of their reliance on transfer 
income, in all likelihood would be the ones most negatively affected by the policy 
change.22  
The late reform period results suggest an improvement in comparison with the 
implementation period. Unlike the early policy results, none of the late policy results are 
statistically significant at 5% level. Only the results relative to married couples with 
children are almost significant at 10% level. This lack of significance implies no strong 
long-term policy effect.  Apart for their low significance the results suggest that in the 
late reform period the consumption levels among Ontario single mothers had actually 
risen relative to Ontario childless single women. The magnitude of the increase is 
between three and a half and eight percent. Relative to other control groups, the Ontario 
single mothers’ consumption levels increased following the early reform period but 
                                                 
22 A possible explanation for this puzzle is that married couples consist of two individuals who can adjust 
their employment decisions and that these families are more flexible in their reactions to policy changes 
than single adult households. Alternatively it could be the case that men in the married couple families face 
different labor market conditions.  
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nevertheless remained lower than the pre reform estimates. Relative to Married couples 
with children, the post policy decrease in consumption levels fluctuate around seven 
percent. 
The marginal effects of the time period treatment interaction dummy variable that 
summarizes the difference in difference component of the regression results are presented 
in Table 8. All figures are presented per household member. The results are similar, 
regardless of whether total expenditure or net income is chosen as the dependent variable. 
The first panel in table 8 indicates that the net income of Ontario single mothers relative 
to that of Quebec and B.C. single mothers fell by 1373 dollars, and total expenditure fell 
by 1396 dollars during the early reform period. Here, the importance of geographically 
different but otherwise similar control groups needs to be emphasized. Unlike in the case 
of ‘raw’ results, these effects are much smaller relative to the other control groups.  
The post implementation policy effects are again statistically insignificant. Their 
magnitudes however consistently point towards a recovery of relative consumption levels 
among Ontario single mother headed households. As table 8 shows, change during the 
late reform period, relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers, turns out to be a decrease 
of 617 dollars of income and 438 dollars of expenditure per household member. The 
decrease relative to married couples is about a hundred dollars. Relative to single 
childless women in Ontario the real income of Ontario single mothers increased by 363 
dollars and total expenditure increased by 172 dollars. The early to late policy changes, 
are much greater when the control group is similar but living in different jurisdictions 
(single mothers in Quebec and B.C.) than when the inverse is true (single childless 
women or married couples in Ontario).  
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5.3. Propensity Score Matching difference in difference results.  
 The final set of results has been obtained through the implementation of the 
propensity score matching adjusted difference in difference techniques. As described in 
the methodology section, subjects within the treatment group were matched to a weighted 
average of subjects in the control group. The matching was done based on a number of 
observable characteristics. The variables used to determine propensity scores were age, 
household size, and a dummy variable for and urban area of residence. In each period, 
observations in the treatment group were matched to observations in one of the control 
groups. The average difference in consumption during each period was then calculated. 
Finally, in order to obtain difference in difference results, the average mean difference 
during the base period was subtracted from the average mean differences in each of the 
policy periods. Matching was done over a determined common support range and, 
therefore, excluded those subjects for whom no suitable match could be found.23 
Table 9 contains the results of the matched difference in difference experiment. 
The early reform fall in the total expenditure relative to Quebec and B.C. single mothers 
is now only 1102 dollars and the fall in net income is 959 dollars. These declines are 
similar to those for the ‘raw’ and regression adjusted difference in difference estimates in 
tables 5 and 8. The results for the late reform period indicate that the consumption levels 
among Ontario single mothers have improved by more than can be suggested by 
regression adjusted procedures. An decrease of just 90 dollars of income and 117 dollars 
of total expenditure is noted relative to single mothers in Quebec and B.C. The strength 
of this conclusion however is undermined by low significance of the late reform period 
matched results. Another way to interpret this result is to argue that the low significance 
                                                 
23 In each case presented more the 95% of observations were included in the analysis. 
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of the late reform estimates indicates no long-term policy effects regardless of their 
magnitude. Arguably this conclusion holds for each control group and across either 
measure of consumption. 
 
6. Conclusions. 
 
 This paper looks at the effects of a series of 1995-1998 Ontario welfare reforms 
on consumption levels among the province’s single mothers. I merge several Canadian 
Family Expenditure Surveys and Surveys of Household Spending. I use net income and 
total expenditure as measures of household consumption. Based on available data I divide 
the timeframe into three periods: the pre reform period (1982-1992), the early reform 
period (1996-1998), and the late reform period (1998-2000). A two stage difference in 
difference design is used to evaluate the relative changes in the consumption levels 
among Ontario single mothers. I compare these treatment group changes to changes in 
the consumption levels among three different control groups, namely single mothers in 
Quebec and B.C., single childless women in Ontario and married couples with children in 
Ontario. The natural experiment is set during the era of widespread welfare reforms in 
Canada. Consequently, the counterfactual for the experiment is that of less extensive 
policy changes rather than of absolute policy stability.  
 I provide three sets of difference in difference estimates. First, I look at changes in 
mean differences in reported incomes and expenditures. Second, I provide regression 
adjusted difference in difference results. Finally, I use propensity score matching 
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difference in difference estimators in order to eliminate possible sources of bias, resulting 
from comparing groups with potentially different average characteristics. 
Table 10 summarizes the key results discussed in the preceding section. I find that 
the early reform period had significant negative effects on the consumption levels among 
Ontario single mothers. Those effects were negative relative to all control groups and 
remained so across all the difference in difference specifications. This initial impact 
however, was offset by positive changes in the late reform period. The magnitudes of the 
late reform results suggest either partial or complete recovery. The low significance of 
the late reform results reinforces the hypothesis of no long-term policy effects on the 
consumption levels of Ontario single mothers relative to each of the three groups used for 
comparison.  
The choice of dependent variable matters least when Quebec and B.C. single 
mothers are used as a control group; the relative changes in net income and total 
expenditure suggest the same pattern, and are of similar magnitude. When Ontario based 
control groups are used, an a priori choice of the dependent variable partially affects the 
conclusions drawn from the experiment.  
To my knowledge, the use of control groups from different jurisdictions and the 
utilization of matching estimators differentiate my approach from previous related work. 
As shown, I find that both innovations add potential new information on the overall effect 
of the welfare reform.  
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Table 1. By province: number of welfare recipients 1995 and 1998. 
Year Ontario Quebec B.C. 
1995 1,344,600 802,200 374,300 
1998 1,091,300 725,700 297,400 
Reduction + 19% 10% 21% 
 
+ The reduction is expressed as percentage of the 1995 figures 
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Table 2. Group sample sizes, population represented, mean components of budget 
constraint and mean total expenditure, by year of survey. 
 
Year Variable SM Ontario SM Que. & BC 
Single no 
child, 
Ontario 
Married with 
Child, 
Ontario 
1982 Sample size 71 118 164 708 
 Population size 78637 94609 210868 801976 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2235 2839 5193 733 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 9311 8445 23272 12264 
 Net Income 8988 7958 21681 11512 
 Total Expenditure 8424 7832 18210 9361 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 157 -331 863 1084 
 Alimony (if > 0) 2315 1913   
1986 Sample size 86 122 183 562 
 Population size 99920 105890 231460 747230 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2681 3200 5735 656 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 7802 7754 27941 13176 
 Net Income 7612 7318 23462 11696 
 Total Expenditure 7710 7235 19706 10326 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -510 -157 2109 273 
 Alimony (if > 0) 2478 1973   
1992 Sample size 100 106 143 463 
 Population size 171660 146395 218829 794600 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 3381 2843 4533 1062 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 8105 8537 32497 13656 
 Net Income 8687 8359 24095 12250 
 Total Expenditure1 9460 8219 20270 10493 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -1052 -400 661 434 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1933 2425   
1996 Sample size 70 113 166 429 
 Population size 119344 154712 247754 717704 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 3539 2919 5323 1117 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 7718 10978 29030 14413 
 Net Income 7632 9448 22520 12513 
 Total Expenditure 7353 8585 18711 9974 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -140 309 1584 1199 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1385 2002   
1997 Sample size 114 235 144 505 
 Population size 170229 197243 259994 859234 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 3371 2611 4636 982 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 8756 8764 30359 15638 
 Net Income 7673 8140 21517 12730 
 Total Expenditure 7721 8094 18218 10861 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -685 -388 1424 697 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1728 1883   
 
+ Transfer income refers to total government transfer income 
++ Change in assets refers to a yearly net change in assets and liabilities 
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Table 2. Cts. Group sample sizes, population represented, mean components of budget 
constraint and mean total expenditure, by year of survey. 
 
Year Variable SM Ontario SM Que. & BC 
Single no 
child, 
Ontario 
Married with 
Child, 
Ontario 
1998 Sample size 96 188 126 489 
 Population size 147061 186924 247142 893165 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2825 2728 3262 968 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 8122 8593 30711 15784 
 Net Income 8215 8220 24195 12834 
 Total Expenditure 8439 7943 20713 11013 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -845 -207 1325 622 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1775 1971   
1999 Sample size 103 207 130 484 
 Population size 177508 190903 236991 835365 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2862 2816 6127 1040 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 7404 8104 34321 15684 
 Net Income 8477 8445 23708 12799 
 Total Expenditure 8518 8557 19767 11014 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -477 -558 2787 520 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1585 1952   
2000 Sample size 82 153 122 449 
 Population size 175541 182962 226583 862015 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2559 2549 4963 907 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 11187 8502 29068 15962 
 Net Income 9407 8841 21294 13384 
 Total Expenditure 9513 8417 19252 11293 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -701 36 113 999 
 Alimony (if > 0) 1413 1835   
2001 Sample size 74 168 133 489 
 Population size 152616 176874 224102 884209 
 Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 2397 2724 4275 1039 
 Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 9785 8016 35943 16335 
 Net Income 10107 8685 24748 13561 
 Total Expenditure 10420 8469 21491 11197 
 Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) -743 -360 930 1117 
 Alimony (if > 0) 2010 1699   
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Table 3. Income sources by group and year. Proportion of families reporting selected 
budget constraint components greater than or not equal to zero. All figures reported in 
percentage terms.  
 
Year Variable SM Ontario SM Que. & BC 
Single no 
child, 
Ontario 
Married with 
Child, 
Ontario 
1982  Sample size 71 118 164 708 
 % of Transfer Income (if > 0) 100 100 41 100 
  Wage Income (if > 0) 72 62 80 96 
  Change in assets (if ~= 0) 58 62 45 31 
  Alimony (if > 0) 41 49   
1986  Sample size 86 122 183 562 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 100 100 36 99 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 60 53 74 96 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 77 80 45 44 
  Alimony (if > 0) 41 34   
1992  Sample size 100 106 143 463 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 99 99 63 99 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 64 59 74 96 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 74 70 47 42 
  Alimony (if > 0) 37 52   
1996  Sample size 70 113 166 429 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 96 94 64 77 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 54 64 64 93 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 74 60 51 34 
  Alimony (if > 0) 39 43   
1997  Sample size 114 235 144 505 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 96 94 69 70 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 51 67 70 98 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 68 65 52 39 
  Alimony (if > 0) 41 39   
1998  Sample size 96 188 126 489 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 94 98 60 70 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 68 65 80 98 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 76 66 49 40 
  Alimony (if > 0) 44 42   
1999  Sample size 103 207 130 484 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 98 95 57 69 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 80 71 72 98 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 61 74 44 43 
  Alimony (if > 0) 47 43   
2000  Sample size 82 153 122 449 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 93 95 79 88 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 72 75 71 99 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 55 63 52 42 
  Alimony (if > 0) 43 46   
2001  Sample size 74 168 133 489 
 % of Transfer Income ( if > 0 ) 91 96 65 69 
  Wage Income ( if > 0 ) 78 71 68 98 
  Change in assets ( if ~= 0 ) 61 59 59 38 
  Alimony (if > 0) 43 49   
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Table 4. Probit for labor force participation. 
 
  Probability of participating in LF Probability of working 52 weeks 
Control group Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
Quebec & BC 
single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 dF/dx+ Robust Std. Err+. dF/dx Robust Std. Err. dF/dx Robust Std. Err. dF/dx Robust Std. Err. dF/dx Robust Std. Err. dF/dx Robust Std. Err.
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-0.160 0.060 <0.001 0.053 **0.062 0.017 -0.098 0.053 0.014 0.060 0.078 0.045 
Period 
x 
Treatment 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.068 0.065 **0.181 0.041 **0.103 0.010 *0.007 0.062 **0.186 0.061 **0.145 0.043 
treatment group *0.075 0.042 **-0.208 0.057 **-0.473 0.039 0.039 0.044 **-0.192 0.055 **-0.393 0.034 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 0.040 0.037 **-0.084 0.035 **-0.141 0.020 0.051 0.038 -0.046 0.036 **-0.108 0.021 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 **0.092 0.037 **-0.133 0.039 **-0.146 0.021 0.041 0.039 **-0.084 0.039 **-0.076 0.021 
Age of head **0.015 0.002 **-0.012 0.001 **0.003 0.001 **0.015 0.002 **-0.006 0.001 **0.011 0.001 
Household size **-0.063 0.014 **-0.066 0.020 **-0.025 0.006 **-0.044 0.014 **-0.061 0.022 **-0.025 0.009 
City Indicator *0.061 0.036 **0.099 0.038 0.019 0.015 **0.068 0.033 **0.100 0.038 0.027 0.020 
 
+ Apart for age and h-hold size dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 
++ Here and thereafter ‘Robust’ refers to heteroscedasticity consistent White variance estimator. 
** significant at 5% level 
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Table 5. ‘Raw’ difference in difference estimates+. All numbers expressed in 1992 dollars. 
 
Net income Total expenditure 
Control group Time period 
Difference 
Difference in 
difference 
[std. error] 
Difference
Difference in 
difference 
[std. error] 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 546    --- 738 ---
Single mothers 
Quebec and B.C. 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -684 
**-1230 
[525] -307 
**-1045 
[469] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 606 
60 
[531] 702 
-37 
[475] 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 -14288    --- -10593 ---
Single women, no 
children 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -14757 
-469 
[1182] -11230 
-637 
[923] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 -13666 
622 
[1211] -10783 
-190 
[946] 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 -3303    --- -1339 ---
Married couples with 
children 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -4833 
**-1530 
[530] -2659 
**-1321 
[401] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 -4032 
-728 
[538] -1979 
-641 
[408] 
 
+ The first columns under net income and total expenditure respectively describe the average difference between the treatment and the relevant control groups 
within each period. For example: during the late policy period Ontario single mothers on average reported net incomes 606 dollars higher than Quebec and B.C. 
single mothers. The second columns under net income and total expenditure summarize the average difference in difference result. For example: relative to 
Quebec and B.C. single mothers the average net income of Ontario single mothers increased by 60 dollars between the pre reform period and the late reform 
period. 
** significant at 5% level 
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Table 6. Net Income Regression. (inv sinh) 
 
control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err.
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-0.133 0.050 -0.050 0.058 **-0.128 0.043 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.054 0.055 0.073 0.067 -0.073 0.049 
Treatment group dummy **0.086 0.035 **-0.547 0.055 **-0.642 0.030 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -0.042 0.032 **-0.118 0.041 -0.013 0.018 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.042 0.032 **-0.127 0.048 0.027 0.019 
Age of head **0.024 0.002 0.001 0.001 **0.014 0.001 
Household size **-0.232 0.013 **-0.242 0.021 **-0.234 0.008 
City indicator **0.119 0.032 **0.180 0.040 **0.072 0.018 
Constant **9.284 0.070 **10.701 0.076 **10.379 0.053 
 
** significant at 5% level 
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Table 7. Total Expenditure Regression. (inv sinh) 
 
control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err.
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-0.137 0.049 *-0.097 0.052 **-0.148 0.041 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.038 0.051 0.035 0.059 -0.068 0.044 
Treatment group dummy **0.130 0.036 **-0.383 0.053 **-0.431 0.030 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -0.028 0.031 -0.046 0.034 < 0.001 0.016 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.005 0.031 -0.027 0.040 **0.057 0.016 
Age of head **0.018 0.001 *-0.002 0.001 **0.009 0.001 
Household size **-0.227 0.012 **-0.248 0.020 **-0.213 0.008 
City indicator **0.066 0.032 **0.085 0.036 **0.060 0.016 
Constant **9.491 0.064 **10.735 0.065 **10.346 0.047 
 
** significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 36
Table 8. Difference in difference regression adjusted results - marginal effects of treatment interaction dummies for the early and late 
policy periods. All numbers expressed in 1992 dollars. 
 
Control groups Time period Net income Total expenditure 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-1373 **-1396 Single mothers 
Quebec and B.C.  Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -617 -438 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -199 *-377 Single women, no 
children Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 363 172 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-183 **-209 Married couples with 
children Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -127 -118 
 
Each number represents a change in average differences between the treatment group and the control groups. For example: relative to Quebec and B.C. single 
mothers the average net income of Ontario single mothers fell by 1373 dollars between the pre reform period and the early reform period. 
** indicates a marginal effect, when the difference in difference coefficient is significant at 5% level 
* indicates a marginal effect, when the difference in difference coefficient is significant 10% level 
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Table 9. Difference in difference propensity score adjusted matching estimates. Matching on propensity score from a logistic 
regression on presence in the treatment group. Epanechnikov Kernel matching. All numbers expressed in 1992 dollars. 
 
Net income Total expenditure 
Control groups Time period 
Difference Difference in difference. Difference
Difference in 
difference. 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 623    --- 809 ---
Single mothers 
Quebec and B.C. 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -478 
**-1102 
[438] -150 
**-959 
[448] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 533 
-90 
[547] 692 
-117 
[560] 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 -14997    --- -11803 ---
Single women, no 
children 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -16905 
*-1908 
[1472] -12518 
-716 
[904] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 -15751 
-754 
[1452] -12288 
-486 
[1054] 
 Pre reform: 1982, 1986, 1992 -6942    --- -4193 ---
Married couples with 
children 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -7595 
-652 
[514] -5179 
**-986 
[445] 
 Late reform: 1999, 2000, 2001 -6602 
340 
[548] -4408 
-215 
[526] 
 
The first columns under net income and total expenditure respectively describe the average difference between the treatment and the relevant control groups 
within each period. For example: during the late policy period Ontario single mothers on average reported net incomes 533 dollars higher than Quebec and B.C. 
single mothers. The second columns under net income and total expenditure summarize the average difference in difference result. For example: relative to 
Quebec and B.C. single mothers the average net income of Ontario single mothers decreased by 90 dollars between the pre reform period and the late reform 
period. 
** significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level 
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Table 10. Summary of difference in difference results form tables 5, 8 and 9. 
 
Raw Regression adjusted 
Propensity score matching 
adjusted Control groups Time period 
Net 
Income 
Total 
Expenditure
Net 
Income 
Total 
Expenditure
Net 
Income 
Total 
Expenditure
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-1230 **-1045 **-1373 **-1396 **-1102  **-959Single mothers  
Quebec and B.C.  Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 60 -37 -617 -438 -90  -117
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -469 -637 -199 *-377 *-1908  -716Single women, no 
children Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 622 -190 363 172 -754  -486
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-1530 **-1321 **-183 **-209 -652  **-986Married couples with 
children Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -728 -641 -127 -118 340  -215
 
** significant at 5% level 
* significant at 10% level
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Appendix 1. A look at various components of the budget constraint - a regression 
adjusted difference in difference approach. Will be made available on internet. 
 
Tables A1, A2 and A3 contain results of regressions on government transfer 
income, wage income, and net yearly change in assets and liabilities respectively. The 
magnitude of several of these interaction terms and of the dummy variable coefficients is 
implausible.   
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Table A1. Government Transfer Income regression (inverse sinh) Will be made 
available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: 0.319 0.186 **-1.014 0.330 **1.728 0.180 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 *0.092 0.197 **-1.541 0.356 **1.268 0.184 
Treatment group dummy *-0.188 0.107 **4.497 0.282 **1.468 0.104 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-0.231 0.108 **1.172 0.285 **-1.688 0.103 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 *-0.194 0.115 **1.288 0.313 **-1.416 0.101 
Age of head **-0.072 0.007 **0.078 0.008 **-0.069 0.006 
Household size 0.072 0.048 0.103 0.082 **0.236 0.045 
City indicator **-0.310 0.104 **-0.975 0.258 **-0.198 0.097 
Constant **10.709 0.266 **1.236 0.452 **8.459 0.266 
 
 
Table A2. Wage Income Regression. (inv sinh) Will be made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: **-1.435 0.515 -0.276 0.532 *-0.737 0.419 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.413 0.526 **1.931 0.565 *0.812 0.429 
Treatment group dummy **0.775 0.386 **-1.927 0.519 **-4.299 0.313 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 0.392 0.342 *-0.564 0.305 0.138 0.084 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 **0.873 0.338 **-0.833 0.352 **0.326 0.081 
Age of head **0.174 0.015 **-0.114 0.009 **0.034 0.007 
Household size **-0.728 0.120 **-0.847 0.200 **-0.448 0.053 
City indicator **0.814 0.304 **1.296 0.339 **0.258 0.089 
Constant 0.571 0.679 **13.093 0.539 **9.914 0.307 
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Table A3. Yearly Net Change in Assets and liabilities regression. (inv sinh) Will be 
made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: -0.891 0.729 **1.566 0.792 0.523 0.629 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 0.477 0.813 **2.587 0.880 **1.834 0.710 
Treatment group dummy -0.343 0.559 **-4.410 0.749 **-4.656 0.494 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **1.312 0.485 *-0.987 0.576 0.206 0.310 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 *0.912 0.497 -0.912 0.617 -0.136 0.314 
Age of head **0.057 0.021 -0.018 0.016 **0.057 0.016 
Household size -0.242 0.174 0.069 0.260 -0.461 0.132 
City indicator **0.982 0.436 0.880 0.541 **0.245 0.301 
Constant **-3.837 0.987 **1.957 0.960 **1.456 0.785 
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 Appendix 2: Extensions of initial results - a look at various components of total 
expenditure. Regression adjusted difference in difference approach. Will be made 
available on internet. 
 
 This section looks at how the consumption patterns of lower income single 
mothers differed from the mean estimates. The output of bootstrapped quintile 
regressions24 on the 25th percentile of net income and expenditure distributions is 
summarized in tables A4 and A5 summarize respectively. These results indicate that the 
early reform relative fall in the net income and total expenditure of Ontario single 
mothers was less severe at the 25th percentile of income or expenditure distributions than 
at their respective means. This finding is potentially important given the previously 
suggested trend of a proportion of Ontario single mothers dropping out of the labor force 
in response to the early reforms and returning only during the late reform period. This 
result, combined with information from the tables 2 and 3 in the main body of the paper, 
indicates that the relative fall in the early reform period in the Ontario single mother 
consumption levels was more severe among those whose major source of income was 
wages and not social transfers.  
Tables A6 and A7 summarize regression output when per capita expenditure on 
durables and on necessities respectively are used as the dependent variable. Similarly to 
Browning and Crossley (2004), I find that expenditure on durables25 decreased more 
                                                 
24 200 repetitions each. 
25 Durables are defined as the sum of expenditures on furnishings, car purchases and clothing. 
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significantly than the overall expenditure in response to the negative income shock. Table 
A6 shows that during the early reform period, relative expenditure on durables decreased 
by 26 to 50 percent depending on the control group. These numbers are significantly 
larger than those reported for total expenditure. In times of negative financial shock, 
Ontario single mothers responded with delaying the purchases of goods that were not of 
immediate need. This hypothesis is further reinforced by the results indicated in table A7. 
A regression on necessities26 reveals that the relative household response was much 
lower, and that there was no long term policy effect. 
                                                 
26 Necessities are defined as the sum of food at home, household operation and clothing 
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Table A4. Bootstrapped Quintile regression, 25% percentile of income, 200 repetitions. 
Will be made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: *-0.094 0.050 0.009 0.093 **-0.082 0.041 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.054 0.059 0.118 0.092 -0.029 0.056 
Treatment group dummy *0.065 0.039 *-0.514 0.077 **-0.715 0.035 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -0.025 0.033 *-0.155 0.083 *-0.034 0.018 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.004 0.035 **-0.203 0.077 -0.013 0.024 
Age of head **0.016 0.002 -0.001 0.002 **0.012 0.001 
Household size **-0.197 0.010 **-0.211 0.016 **-0.210 0.009 
City indicator **0.087 0.029 **0.172 0.064 **0.076 0.019 
Constant **9.176 0.061 **10.333 0.112 **10.162 0.053 
 
 
Table A5. Bootstrapped Quintile regression, 25% percentile of expenditure, 200 
repetitions. Will be made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: **-0.121 0.045 -0.067 0.059 **-0.115 0.040 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.047 0.054 0.114 0.082 -0.087 0.054 
Treatment group dummy **0.107 0.037 **-0.398 0.061 **-0.491 0.034 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -0.012 0.032 -0.045 0.042 -0.012 0.020 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.001 0.036 -0.093 0.062 **0.050 0.021 
Age of head **0.015 0.002 **-0.003 0.001 **0.009 0.001 
Household size -0.211 0.012 **-0.245 0.019 **-0.200 0.007 
City indicator **0.050 0.033 0.069 0.042 *0.032 0.017 
Constant **9.298 0.069 **10.462 0.076 **10.094 0.049 
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Table A6. Durable Expenditure Regression (furnishings, car purchase and clothing). Will 
be made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: **-0.498 0.169 -0.270 0.178 **-0.287 0.131 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.230 0.169 0.040 0.184 -0.140 0.131 
Treatment group dummy **0.407 0.118 **-0.472 0.148 **-0.463 0.081 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 -0.199 0.127 **-0.354 0.129 **-0.328 0.063 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.093 0.124 *-0.236 0.142 -0.079 0.052 
Age of head **0.022 0.006 **-0.014 0.004 *0.007 0.004 
Household size **-0.151 0.033 **-0.204 0.046 **-0.168 0.026 
City indicator 0.101 0.088 0.047 0.101 -0.043 0.044 
Constant **6.777 0.242 **9.029 0.184 **8.254 0.169 
 
 
Table A7. Expenditure on Necessities Regression (food at home, household operation 
and clothing). Will be made available on internet. 
 
Control groups: Quebec & BC single mothers 
Single Women, 
no children Ontario 
Married Couples 
with Children, Ontario 
 Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. Coef Robust Std. Err. 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Earl
1996, 1997, 1998 
y reform: **-0.140 0.048 **-0.118 0.050 **-0.124 0.040 Period*SM 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 -0.015 0.051 0.058 0.057 0.010 0.044 
Treatment group dummy **0.071 0.034 **-0.201 0.051 **-0.239 0.029 
Pre reform: 
1982, 1986, 1992 base --- base --- base --- 
Early reform: 
1996, 1997, 1998 **-0.113 0.032 **-0.141 0.033 **-0.128 0.017 Period 
Late reform: 
1999, 2000, 2001 **-0.062 0.031 **-0.120 0.039 **-0.077 0.017 
Age of head **0.016 0.001 0.001 0.001 **0.010 0.001 
Household size **-0.158 0.012 **-0.191 0.019 **-0.160 0.008 
City indicator **0.063 0.028 **0.125 0.034 **0.080 0.017 
Constant **8.392 0.067 **9.222 0.064 **8.896 0.049 
 
 
 
 46
